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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-22(3)0). On October 20, 2008 this Court granted the Utah Association for Justice's
("UAJ") motion to appear as amicus curiae.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
UAJ adopts the statement of issues presented and standards of review,
along with the statement of the case, submitted by appellant Tina Archuleta in her
opening brief. (Br. of Aplt. at 1-2.)
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §58-13-4; id. § 58-13-5(7); id § 26-25-1.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court dismissed Ms. Archuleta's case on three grounds: First, that
section 58-13-5(7) of the Utah Code "clearly" protects hospitals against claims of
negligent credentialing. (R. 325.) Second, section 58-13-4 provides the same
immunity "for many categories of decisions and determinations." (Id.) And third,
the court dismissed the case because "negligent credentialing does not exists
because of the broad immunity granted to health facilities under Utah Code
Annotated §26-25-1." (Id.)
Ms. Archuleta ably points out that the premise of the cause of action for
negligent credentialing is that a hospital has an independent duty to its patients to
ensure that health care providers who practice at the hospital are reasonably fit to

perform the services for which they are given credentials by the hospital. This is
merely a restatement of the general duty of reasonable care owed by all hospitals
to its patients. As addressed in Ms. Archuleta's Opening Brief, there are many
compelling policy reasons why this Court should now hold that it is.
In this brief, UAJ focuses on the specific legislative history behind the
statutes relied on by the trial court to show that they in no way abrogate, or
prevent the adoption of, a common-law cause of action for negligent credentialing.
In addition, the vast majority of courts that have considered this question
nationwide have concluded that their states should and do recognize a cause of
action for negligent credentialing. This is based on compelling public policy
reasons, the foremost of which is that because patients are not able to select their
surgeons, anesthesiologists, staff nurses, and other providers, hospitals owe an
independent duty of care to their patients to ensure that the providers given
credentials were screened for their fitness to practice in certain areas.
Utah should join the majority of states that afford its citizens protection
from negligent credentialing by hospitals. Doing so would not infringe on any
statutory law, and any holding to the contrary would have disastrous effects on the
provision of healthcare to Utah's citizens who are treated in hospitals. In essence,
not to recognize the cause of action would mean that hospitals have no duty to
ensure that providers using their facilities are fit to practice. This would leave
patients wondering if their anesthesiologist, their general surgeon, their assisting
surgeons, their staff nurse, their physical therapist, or any of the many other health
2

care providers who practice in hospitals really are qualified to perform their jobs.
And this uncertainty and fear would impact Utah's citizens—both patients and
their families—at their most vulnerable times: when they are so ill or so severely
injured that they must be treated in a hospital setting.
ARGUMENT
As argued by Ms. Archuleta, Utah law already impliedly recognizes a cause
of action for negligent credentialing, having weighed in on the issue as early as
1907. (Aplt. Br. at 11-12.1) UAJ incorporates and adopts the arguments made by
Ms. Archuleta in support of formally recognizing the cause of action, and in
addition provides the following history of the statutes incorrectly interpreted by
the trial court as authority for dismissing Ms. Archuleta's cause of action outright.
I.

UTAH STATUTORY LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING
The trial court's ruling cited both the Utah Health Care Providers Immunity

from Liability Act2 and the Utah care-review statute3 in granting St. Marks'
1

Citing Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Mem 7 Hosp. Ass 'n, 78 P.2d 645, 652 (Utah
1938); Sessions v. Thomas Dee Mem 7 Hosp. Ass % 89 Utah 222, 51 P.2d 229, 231
(Utah 1935) (stating "hospitals . . . are not liable to their patients for injuries from
the negligence of their employees, when reasonable care is used in the selection
and retention of an employee") (emphasis added); Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy
Cross Hosp. Ass % 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 691, 696 (Utah 1907) (overruled on other
grounds).
2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 58-13-1 through -5.

3

Id. §§ 26-25-1 through -5. Chapter 25 of title 26 is titled "Confidential
Information Release" and is referred to as the care-review statute.

3

motion to dismiss. (R. 325.) Specifically, the trial court held that section 58-135(7) of the Utah Code "clearly insulates a hospital from negligence claims
stemming from credentialing"; that section 58-13-4 "also grants immunity to
health care facilities for claims such as this by immunizing them for many
categories of decisions and determinations"; and that "negligent credentialing does
not exist because of the broad immunity granted to health facilities under Utah
Code Annotated § 26-25-1." (R. 325.)
A close examination of those statutes, however, shows that the Utah
Legislature did not intend to preclude all claims against hospitals for negligent
credentialing.4 In construing a statute, this Court looks to the reason, spirit, and
sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the
statute.5 "[AJbsent an indication that the legislature intends a statute to supplant
common law, the courts should not give it that effect."6

"Credentialing decisions determine which physicians are granted hospital
privileges and what specific procedures they can perform in the hospital." Larson
v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 301 (Minn. 2007).
5

E.g., In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, \ 23, 1 P.3d 1074.

6

Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95,129, 61 P.3d 989 (Durham, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinlan, 678 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D.
Mich. 1988), which in turn was quoting NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01, at 422 (4th ed. 1984)).
4

A.

Negligent Credentialing Claims Are Not Barred by Utah's PeerReview Statute

The trial court concluded that two provisions of the Health Care Providers
Immunity from Liability Act (title 58, chapter 13 of the Utah Code) "clearly"
insulate hospitals from negligent credentialing claims. A review of the history of
that Act will show why that ruling was incorrect.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there were increasing concerns about the quality of
health care. To avoid greater government regulation, the healthcare industry
undertook to strengthen its efforts at self-regulation. Doctors, however, were
reluctant to participate in disciplinary actions against other physicians, in part
because of a natural reluctance to sit in judgment on fellow professionals and in
part because of liability concerns. Those concerns were not unfounded.
Physicians who were disciplined or who lost hospital privileges would file
lawsuits, accusing their peers and the hospitals on whose boards they served of
using the peer review process to eliminate competition in violation of the antitrust
laws,8 of violating their civil rights,9 of defaming their characters,10 or of breaching
n

These concerns culminated on the federal level with the enactment of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52, and the
creation of the National Practitioner Data Bank.
8

E.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1988); Decker v. IHCHosps., Inc.,
982 F.2d 433, 434 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993); Marrese v.
Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, All U.S. 1027
(1985); Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
9

E.g., Decker, 982 F.2d at 434; Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp.
1226, 1230 (D. Del. 1985).

5

jtheir contracts.11 So to increase participation in the peer-review process, the
medical profession sought immunity from such claims.
Originally, the immunity provisions of Utah law that the lower court relied
on, Utah Code sections 58-13-4 and 58-13-5(7), were contained in two separate
acts. The predecessor of section 58-13-4 was part of the Immunity from Liability
Act, title 58, chapter 12, part 4, of the Utah Code.12 The predecessor of section
58-13-5 was part of the Medical Practice Act, title 58, chapter 12, part 5, of the
Utah Code.13
The predecessor to current section 58-13-4 was enacted in 1969, in the
wake of Medicare and Medicaid, which required that some services be subject to
utilization review to ensure that recipients of public benefits were not receiving
unnecessary or inappropriate medical care. The statute immunized physicians

10

Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1984); Atkins v. Walker, 445 N.E.2d
1132, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Mayfieldv. Gleichert, 484 S.W.2d 619, 621
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Guntheroth v. Rodaway, 727 P.2d 982, 982-84 (Wash.
1986).
11

E.g., Decker, 982 F.2d at 434; Posner, 645 F. Supp. at 1105; Rees v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1991).
12

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 58-12-23 through -25 (renumbered §§ 58-13-2 through -4

in 1996).
13

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 58-12-26 through -44 (repealed 1985,1990, 1993, 1994,

1995, 1996, 1997).

6

from liability arising from the provision of information to or decisions made while
serving on "utilization review committees."1 Specifically, the statute provided:
Physicians serving upon utilization review committees Immunity from liability with respect to decisions - Good faith. Physicians appointed and serving upon utilization review
committees, established to determine if hospitals and extended care
facilities are being properly utilized, or physicians or other persons
furnishing information to such committees upon the committees'
official request for the purpose of determining questions relating to
the hospitalization of medicare patients under the provisions of
public law 89-97,15 or for the purpose of determining whether there
is proper and efficient use of hospitals and extended care facilities
maintained for the use of all patients, shall be immune from liability
with respect to such information or decisions furnished or made in
good faith and without malice; provided that nothing in this act shall
be construed to relieve any physician from liability he may incur
from professional care and treatment of any patient.16
The statute covered only physicians, not hospitals, and there was no mention of
immunity for anything that could fairly be said to encompass credentialing
decisions. The legislative history of this act is sparse, but its apparent purpose was
to encourage the free flow of information by immunizing physicians from liability
to other health-care providers whose livelihoods might be hurt by the decisions of

14

See S.B. 113, 38th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1969 Utah Laws ch. 168, § 1, codified as
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-25 (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13-4).
15

Pub. L. 89-97 was the Social Security Act of 1965, which established Medicare
and Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
16

S.B. 113, 38th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1969 Utah Laws ch. 168, § 1.

7

utilization review committees.

The immunity the statute provided was not

absolute but applied only where the physician acted in good faith and without
malice, and the statute did not provide immunity for claims arising out of
negligent treatment.
The statute was amended in 1976 to extend to physicians who provided
information to, or served on: (1) committees evaluating and improving the quality
of medical care, (2) committees determining whether rendered medical care was
necessary, and (3) committees determining whether the cost of such medical care
was reasonable. Again, only individual physicians were immunized; the
immunity provided was a qualified immunity, not absolute; and the immunity did
not extend to claims arising out of negligent treatment. Credentialing was again
18

not mentioned.
In 1988, the statute was amended to substitute "health care providers" (as
defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act) for "physicians" and to extend
the protections of the statute to "health care providers serving on ethical standards
17

Cf. Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 1007 (Ohio 1993) (the purpose of Ohio's
statute, which is substantially similar to Utah's, was "to encourage the free flow of
information without threat of reprisal in the form of civil liability," "for the
obvious reason that it could be difficult to staff a committee absent such
protections"; the statute protects providers of information to a committee and
participants on the committee but does not excuse a hospital's negligence in
granting staff privileges to an incompetent physician), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1111
(1994).
18

S.B. 5, 41st Leg., Budget Sess., 1976 Utah Laws ch. 4, § 4.

8

review committees."19 Credentialing decisions were not mentioned, and the
statute continued to disclaim immunity for any liability arising out of the provision
of medical care.
Following technical and stylistic amendments in 1992,20 the statute was
amended again in 1996. The 1996 amendment to section 58-12-25 was primarily
stylistic. It broke out the various functions for which qualified immunity was
provided into subsections, with the following introduction: "Health care providers
serving in the following capacities and the organizations or entities sponsoring
these activities are immune from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions,
or determinations made or information furnished in good faith and without malice
...."

91

The amendment also extended its protections to "members of licensing

boards established under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, to license and
99

regulate health care providers."

Finally, the amendment created a presumption

that health care providers serving on committees or providing information to them
"acted in good faith and without malice, absent clear and convincing evidence to
9^

the contrary."

19

S.B. 13, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1988 Utah Laws ch. 130, § 3.

20

S.B. 126, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 Utah Laws ch. 240, § 4.

21

S.B. 97, 51st Leg., Gen. Sess., 1996 Utah Laws ch. 248, § 5.
See id.

23

Id.
9

Section 58-12-25, which was renumbered section 58-13-4 in 1996, does
not bar this action because the decisions to credential and re-credential Dr.
Halverson were not made by a committee established to determine if hospitals and
long-term care facilities are being used properly (subsection (2)(a)(i)); by a
committee established to evaluate and improve the quality of health care or to
review provided health care to determine if it was necessary, appropriate, properly
performed, or provided at a reasonable cost (subsection (2)(a)(ii)); by a committee
functioning under federal law (subsection (2)(a)(iii)); by an ethical standards
review committee (subsection (2)(a)(iv)); or by a committee established to
evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or the performance of health or
hospital services to, patients in Utah (subsection (2)(a)(v)). Nor is the claim
against members of any licensing board or against anyone for providing
information to one of the committees mentioned (subsections (2)(b) and (c)).
The 1996 amendment was part of an omnibus bill that was intended to
revise the provisions governing medical licensing and extend certain statutes that
were due to expire July 1, 1996, under various sunset provisions, including the
Immunity from Liability Act and the Utah Medical Practice Act. According to an
analysis provided by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
(DOPL) of the Utah Department of Commerce, the re-write of the Immunity from
Liability Act that the 1996 amendment undertook was meant "to continue with
24

See S.B. 156, 51st Leg., Gen. Sess., 1996 Utah Laws ch. 253, § 4.

10

current provisions and consolidate like provisions from the Medical Practice Act
[title 58, chapter 12, part 5]." In other words, no substantive change in the law
was intended.
The "like provision" of the Medical Practice Act was former section 58-1243 (renumbered section 58-13-5 as part of the 1996 consolidation).
was first enacted in 1976.

That section

It authorized the Physician's Licensing Board to

obtain information about the quality and adequacy of medical care rendered to
patients by licensed physicians and imposed a duty on licensed health-care
providers and hospital officials to furnish information the board requested.27 It
provided qualified immunity to any person or organization furnishing requested
information to the board and to board members for any decisions made or actions
taken in response to the information the board acquired.28 Later amendments
required health care facilities to report in writing to the board any formal
disciplinary action against physicians relating to professional ethics, medical
competence, moral turpitude, or drug or alcohol abuse and provided that the data

25

See S.B. 97, 51st Leg., Gen. Sess., 1996 Utah Laws ch. 248, §§ 6, 58, & 60(1).

26

S.B. 5, 41st Leg., Budget Sess., 1976 Utah Laws ch. 4, § 8.

27

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-43(1) (repealed 1996) (current version
CODE ANN. § 58-13-5(2) (DOPL and its boards shall adopt rules for

at UTAH
obtaining
information concerning the quality and adequacy of health care rendered, and
licensed health care providers have a duty to furnish requested information)).

28

See S.B. 5, 41st Leg., Budget Sess., 1976 Utah Laws ch. 4, § 8.
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and information so obtained would be confidential.

It also provided for

qualified immunity for those furnishing information in accordance with the act and
to members of any DOPL board taking action in response to the information.30 It
did not deal with credentialing decisions.
In 1985, the statute was amended to add two provisions. The first made
any review of a health-care provider undertaken by a hospital board confidential,
not subject to discovery, and inadmissible in evidence.

This Court has construed

that provision to mean that "only material and information prepared specifically
for submission to a peer review committee, that are part of peer review or result
from peer review, are privileged . . . ,"32
The other amendment provided:
zy

See S.B. 95, 44th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1981 Utah Laws ch. 30, § 13, codified at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-43(2) & (5) (repealed 1996) (current versions at UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 58-13-5(3) (requiring health-care facilities to report in writing
terminations, suspensions, or restrictions of privileges, disciplinary action,
violations of professional standards or ethics, a finding of incompetence, acts of
moral turpitude, and drug or alcohol abuse) & -5(5) (the data and information so
obtained is "protected" under the Government Records Access and Management
Act (GRAMA), title 63, chapter 2)).
30

See S.B. 95, 44th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1981 Utah Laws ch. 30, § 13, codified at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-43(6) (repealed 1996) (current version at UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-13-5(6)(a) & (b) (2002)).
31

S.B. 155, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1985 Utah Laws ch. 179, § 1, codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-12-43(7) (repealed 1996). Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13-5(5)
(2002).
32

Benson v. I.H.C. Hosps., Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in
original).
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An individual who is a member of a hospital administration, board,
committee, department, medical staff, or professional organization
of health care providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3(1) is
immune from liability arising from participation in a review of a
health care provider's professional ethics, medical competence,
moral turpitude, or substance abuse.33
The title of the act was "Hospital Disciplinary Proceedings
Amendments."34 It did not purport to apply to credentialing decisions. In
introducing the bill, the sponsor, Senator Cornaby, indicated that the bill was
meant to address the problem that some hospitals and medical disciplinary boards
had had to deal with when a health-care provider had been accused of wrongdoing
and later was exonerated.

There was no indication that it was meant to

immunize hospitals from liability for negligent credentialing.
In Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.36, this Court rejected the
argument of Intermountain Health Care that this provision protected hospitals
from all claims arising out of the peer-review process, including those "even

56

S.B. 155, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1985 Utah Laws ch. 179, § 1, codified as UTAH
§ 58-12-43(8) (repealed 1996) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-13-5(7) (2002)).
34
See S.B. 155, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1985 Utah Laws ch. 179, § 1 (emphasis
added). Although the title of a bill is not part of the statute, it may be considered
in interpreting legislative intent when there are ambiguities or doubts in the
wording of the body of the bill. E.g., American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. State,
619 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1980).
CODE ANN.

35

Remarks of Sen. K.S. Cornaby on S.B. 155, Utah State Senate, 46th Leg., Gen.
Sess., Day 26, Feb. 8, 1985, morning session, audiograph disc #59, track 6.

36

Rees, 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).

13

remotely related to a peer review process."

The Court noted that "the plain

language of the statutes [former sections 58-12-25 and 58-12-43(8), now sections
58-13-4 and -5(7)] indicates that their purpose is to protect health care providers
who furnish information regarding the quality of health care rendered by any
individual or facility."

They did not affect a claim arising out of a hospital's

termination of a doctor's privileges.

Similarly, they do not affect a claim arising

out of a hospital's negligent granting of privileges.
The Court in Rees also noted that section 78-14-3(1) (now section 78B-3403), referenced in the statute, defined "health care provider" to include
corporations and other facilities, including hospitals, but concluded that "the
immunity statutes mention protection only for individuals."40 So as part of the
1996 recodification the legislature amended this provision to delete the phrase "as
defined in Subsection 78-14-3(1)" and to insert, between the words "is" and
"immune" in that line, "and any hospital, other health care entity, or professional
organization conducting or sponsoring the review."41
Nothing in section 58-13-5 suggests that the statute was meant to curtail a
patient's right to sue for negligent care he received at a hospital or otherwise affect
37

/d.atl077.

38

M atl078.

39

Id.

40

M atl077.

41

See S.B. 97, 51st Leg., Gen. Sess., 1996 Utah Laws ch. 248, § 6.
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patient care liability. There is no indication that the legislature intended to lower
the prevailing standards of patient care by insulating hospitals from their own
negligence in credentialing physicians and surgeons to use the hospitals. Rather,
the statutory scheme was meant to improve the quality of medical care by
encouraging physicians to serve on review committees and to take whatever action
was necessary to protect the public from incompetent physicians.
In construing the statute, the Court must give effect to the legislature's
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.42 The purpose of
the Medical Practice and Immunity from Liability acts, which are part of title 58,
governing "Occupations and Professions," is to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public from unqualified and incompetent persons holding
themselves out as professionals.43 It is not to protect professionals and those
entities contracting with them from the consequences of their errors that injure the
public. Peer review was meant to improve the quality of medical care;44 it was not
meant to provide a sanctuary for incompetent physicians to continue to wreak their
havoc on unsuspecting members of the public. The occupational and professional
42

E.g., State v. Byrwn, 2002 UT 111, ^j 7, 61 P.3d 1051.

43

E.g., Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531, 533 (1956); Smith v.
American Packing & Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951, 957 (1942).
44

E.g., Marshall v. Planz, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1264 (M.D. Ala. 2001);
California Eye Inst. v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86 (App. 1989) (citation
omitted); Trangle v. Rojas, 2002 Ohio 6510, ^ 28, 782 N.E.2d 617 (citation
omitted).
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licensing statutes do not purport to regulate the physician/patient or
hospital/patient relationship; they regulate only licensed professionals.
Neither the purpose of these statutes nor their legislative history suggest
that they were intended to provide immunity from patient suits. Rather, the
apparent intent was to foster open discussion by protecting those involved in peer
review from claims of retaliation by disciplined doctors. Indeed, it would be
ironic if statutes that were meant to improve the quality of health care by
encouraging full and frank participation were construed to immunize hospitals
from any liability for negligent health care that they could have prevented. If the
statutes were so construed, rather than improving the quality of health care they
could be used as a shield to protect negligent care and would have just the
opposite effect they were intended to have. Patients do not have access to
information about specific physicians that hospitals do through the National
Practitioner Data Bank.45 Thus, patients must rely on hospitals to verify the
qualifications and competency of the physicians and surgeons they credential.
Immunizing hospitals from negligent credentialing claims does not give hospitals
any incentive to monitor the competency of those they credential but would allow
them to credential with impunity physicians and surgeons who pose a serious
threat to the public, thus defeating the purpose of Utah's licensing statutes.

45

See 42 U.S.C. § 11137(a) & (b); Elisabeth Ryzen, The National Practitioner
Data Bank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 419 (1992).
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In construing a statute, the Court has a duty to construe the statute
whenever possible so as to avoid constitutional infirmities.46 If sections 58-13-4
and 58-13-5(7) in fact precluded all claims for negligent credentialing, as the trial
court held, then they might well run afoul of article I, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution, which requires that all courts "be open, and [that] every person, for
an injury done to him in his person .. . have remedy by due course of law . . . . "
Other courts have recognized a distinction between peer review and
credentialing. By granting hospitals immunity for peer review, the legislature did
not eliminate a hospital's duty to its patients "to exercise reasonable care in
ensuring that medical care providers are qualified."47 "'It was never intended that
the peer review process be used in such a way as to effectively bar a plaintiffs tort
action.'"48 Thus, immunity extends only to individuals and institutions when they

40

E.g., American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, \ 9, 63 P.3d 675
(citations omitted).

47

McCall v. Henry Med. Ctr., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 739, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), cert,
denied (Ga. 2002). Accord Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 1007 (Ohio 1993)
(peer-review immunity "does not provide blanket immunity to a hospital for
negligence in granting and/or continuing staff privileges of an incompetent
physician"), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994).
48

McCall, 551 S.E.2d at 742-43 (quoting Emory Univ. Hosp. v. Sweeney, 469
S.E.2d 772, 776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted)).
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are performing a peer-review function—that is, when they are evaluating a
physician's performance of an actual medical procedure.49
As other courts have recognized, the fact that information may be
privileged under a peer-review statute does not mean that no cause of action for
negligent credentialing exists. It may make it more difficult for the plaintiff to
prove his or her claim, but it does not justify closing the courthouse doors to an
injured plaintiff before he has had a chance to try to prove his claim.50 The Court
should preserve the distinction between peer review (that is, review of a
physician's performance in a particular case) and credentialing (review of a
physician's qualifications) and hold that Utah's peer-review and licensing statutes
do not bar a claim for negligent credentialing.
B.

Negligent Credentialing Claims Are Not Barred by Utah's CareReview Statute

The trial court also concluded that Utah's care-review statute, section 2625-1, renders negligent credentialing claims non-existent. (R. 325.) That statute
provides that a person or organization that provides information to a peer-review
committee or health facility's in-house staff committee for the purpose of studying
and advancing medical research to reduce the incidence of disease, morbidity, or
mortality or to evaluate and improve health care rendered by the facility cannot be
49

See id at 743 (citing Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Autk v. Dawson, 509 S.E.2d 28 (Ga.
1998)).
50
E.g., Humana Hosp. Desert Valley v. Superior Court, 742 P.2d 1382, 1386,
1389 (Ariz. Ct. App.), review denied {Axiz. 1987); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 1A\
P.2d 1079, 1087-90 (Wyo. 1987).
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liable for providing the information.

Similarly, there is no liability for providing

information relating to the ethical conduct of any health care provider to peer
review committees or in-hospital staff committees for disciplinary purposes.

The

statute provides that no liability may arise as a result of providing the information,
of releasing or publishing findings and conclusions "to advance health research
and health education," or of releasing or publishing summaries of studies.

The

statute further makes the information furnished and any findings or conclusions
resulting from the studies privileged and not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in
evidence in any legal proceeding.54
This Court has said:
The purpose of these statutes is to improve medical care by allowing
health-care personnel to reduce "morbidity or mortality" and to
provide information to evaluate and improve "hospital and health
care." Without the privilege, personnel might be reluctant to give
such information, and the accuracy of the information and the
effectiveness of the studies would diminish greatly. However, it is
not clear whether these provisions were intended to apply to specific,
individual patients and the specific care given them during or after
an operation .. . ,55
51

52
53

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 26-25-1.

Id. §26-25-1(4).
Id. §26-25-1(5).

54

Id. § 26-25-3. Despite its broad language, the statute does not cover all
documents that might be used in the peer-review process but applies only to
documents "prepared specifically to be submitted for review purposes." Benson,
866 P.2d at 540 (emphasis in original). See also Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg'I Med.
Ctr., 2005 UT App 352,fflf14, 18, 121 P.3d 74 (accord), cert denied, 126 P.3d
772 (Utah 2005).
55

Benson, 866 P.2d at 539.
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Ms. Archuleta's negligent credentialing claim does not seek to hold the
hospital liable for providing information for morbidity and mortality (M&M)
studies or for disciplinary reviews, nor does it seek to hold the hospital liable for
releasing or publishing findings, conclusions, or summaries of studies. It only
seeks to hold the hospital liable for its negligence in allowing Dr. Halverson to use
its facilities. Thus, the care-review statute (title 26, chapter 25 of the Utah Code)
does not bar Ms. Archuleta's claim. As the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized,
"the [care-review] privilege was never intended to shield hospitals from potential
liability or to provide hospitals protection from medical malpractice claims....
[T]he privilege naturally has its limits."56
In sum, the statutes relied on by the trial court in dismissing Ms.
Archuleta's claims outright were never meant to bar an entire cause of action for
negligent credentialing.
II.

A VAST MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS HAS RECOGNIZED A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING FOR
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
As pointed out by Ms. Archuleta, Utah has long recognized that hospitals

owe a duty of reasonable care to their patients, and a cause of action for negligent
hiring, retention, and employment is well-established. (Aplt. Br. at 13-16.)

Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, f 23.

20

Indeed, until recently, Utah trial courts have had little problem recognizing
en

negligent credentialing claims.
Aside from the large body of existing Utah case law that would support
formally adopting the negligent credentialing cause of action, though, there also
exists a clear nationwide majority opinion that the cause of action is cognizable.
CO

Our courts often look to other jurisdictions for guidance.

As also discussed in

Ms. Archuleta's opening brief, almost every state that has considered whether a
claim for negligent credentialing exists has concluded that such a cause of action
not only exists, but should exist to serve the important public policy interests
discussed above.
The number of courts that have considered this question and have either
concluded directly that the cause of action exists or have implicitly recognized the
cause of action is vast. Because the public policy reasons for formally recognizing
D/

See, e.g., Haase v. Ashley Valley Med. Ctr., No. 980800377 (8th Dist. Ct,
Uintah County), reported in Rocky Mountain Verdicts & Settlements, Nov. 2003,
no. 1, case ID 10452; C.G. v. Hull No. 940901894 (3d Dist. Ct., Salt Lake
County), reported in Rocky Mountain Verdicts & Settlements, Sept. 1996, no. 4,
case ID 9615. The jury verdict in Haase was reinstated by the Utah Court of
Appeals in an unpublished decision, Haase v. Ashley Valley Med. Ctr., 2003 UT
App 260 (July 17, 2003). This Court then denied a petition for writ of certiorari
(case no. 20030664-SC). The hospital's appeal did not question that it could be
held liable for its negligence in failing to take appropriate action against a
physician it knew was impaired by drug use, and, in fact, the hospital settled other
negligent credentialing claims involving the same doctor after the jury's verdict in
Haase.
58

See, e.g., Retherfordv. AT&T Communs., 844 P.2d 949, 972-73 (Utah 1992).

21

the cause of action are discussed both in this brief and in Ms. Archuleta's brief,
UAJ will not belabor those cases here. In sum, at least thirty-seven states have
recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing in one form or another.

See, e.g., Coleman v. Bessemer Carraway Methodist Med. Ctr., 589 So.2d 703
(Ala. 1991); Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc. of America, Inc., 661 P.2d
632 (Alaska 1983); Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1976);
Elam v. College ParkHosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Kitto
v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Register v. Wilmington Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 311 A.2d 8 (Del. 1977); Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1989);
Mitchell Co. Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972); Domingo ex rel.
Domingo v. Doe, 985 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Haw. 1997) (construing Hawai'i's
negligent hiring laws and holding that Hawai'i Supreme Court would likely
recognize a cause of action for negligent credentialing), aff'd, 276 f.3d 1083 (9th
Cir.), amended and superseded, 289 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2002); Darling v.
Charleston Commun. Mem 7Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (111. 1965); Leanhart v.
Humana, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1996); Sibley v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana
State Univ., 411 So.2d 1094 (La. 1985); Copithorne v. Framingham Union Hosp.,
520 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1988); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975); Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007); Taylor v.
Singing River Hosp. Sys., 704 So.2d 75 (Miss. 1997) (dicta); State ex rel. Faith
Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Hull v. North Valley
Hosp., 498 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'lHosp., 173
N.W.2d 881 (Neb. 1970); Oehler v. Humana Hosp., 775 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1989);
Moore v. Board of Trs. of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1972) (dicta);
Corleto v. Shore Mem'lHosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975);
Diaz v. Feil, 881 P.2d 745 (N.M. App. 1994); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d
296 (N.Y. 1967); Blanton v. Moses H Cone Mem 'IHosp., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455
(N.C. 1987); Benedict v. St. Luke's Hosps., 365 N.W.2d 499 (N.D. 1985);
Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 1993); Strubhart v. Perry Mem 7 Hosp.
Trust Auth, 903 P.2d263 (Okla. 1995);
Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398 (Or. 1975); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591
A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067 (R.I. 2006); Rodrigues v.
Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1993); Stratienko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Co.
Hosp. Auth., 2006 WL 550460 (unpub.) (Term. Ct. App. 2006); Stottlemyer v.
Ghramm, 2001 WL 34084307 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001) (unpub. op. order) (holding that
Virginia recognizes cause of action for negligent credentialing); Pedroza v.
Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984); Utter v. United Hosp. Ctr., 236 S.E.2d 213
(W. Va. 1977); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis.
1981); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987).
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The most recent state to formally recognize the cause of action, Minnesota, held
that, for the same policy reasons mentioned in this brief, Ms. Archuleta's brief,
and the other cases cited, the cause of action does exist and is not precluded by
that state's similar peer review statute.60 Only two states, Kansas and Texas, have
denied negligent credentialing claims based on state statutes.61
The overwhelming weight of authority nationwide suggests that this Court,
for the same sound policy reasons relied on by nearly all of our sister jurisdictions,
should hold that a cause of action for negligent credentialing is cognizable under
Utah law.
CONCLUSION
UAJ respectfully requests that the Court recognize that, under Utah law, a
plaintiff may pursue a claim of negligent credentialing based on a hospital's
failure to ensure that the providers it gives privileges to are reasonably fit to
practice. If a patient is injured or killed by a hospital's negligent failure to
scrutinize the quality of its health care providers, and but for that negligence the
provider would not have treated the patient at that hospital, the hospital should be
accountable for its negligence. To hold otherwise would be to enshrine public
policy that in the State of Utah, hospitals owe no duty to their patients to ensure

00

See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007), reh 'g denied (Minn.
September 20, 2007).

61

See Lemuz v. Fieser, 933 P.2d 134 (Kan. 1997); St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v.
Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1997).
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that the physicians to whom they grant credentials are minimally competent to
serve Utah's patients during their most acute times of need.
Recognizing negligent credentialing as a cause of action would not run
afoul of any Utah statutory provision. This Court should hold, as argued by Ms.
Archuleta, that the trial court improperly granted St. Mark's motion to dismiss and
remand this case to the trial court for a determination on the merits.
Dated this " f ^ d a y of November, 2008.

Tawni J. Anderson
Attorneys for Utah Association foj/Fustice
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